The tangle

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the technology used as a backbone of iota (a cryptocurrency for Internet-of-Things industry). This technology naturally succeeds the blockchain technology as its next evolutionary step and comes out with features required for micropayments conducted on a global scale.

1 Introduction and description of the system

The rise and success of Bitcoin during the last six years proved the value of blockchain technology. However, this technology also has a number of drawbacks, which prevent it to be used as a one and only global platform for cryptocurrencies. Among these drawbacks, an especially notable one is the impossibility of making micro-payments, which have increased importance for the rapidly developing Internet-of-Things industry. Specifically, in the currently available systems one must pay a fee for making a transaction; so, transferring a very small amount just makes no sense since one would have also to pay the fee which is many times larger. On the other hand, it is not easy to get rid of the fees since they serve as an incentive for the creators of the blocks. It should be also observed that existing cryptocurrencies are heterogeneous systems with clear separation of roles (transaction issuers, transaction approvers). Such systems create unavoidable discrimination of some of their elements which in turn creates conflicts and makes all elements spend resources on conflict resolution. All this justifies a search for solutions essentially different from the blockchain technology, on which the Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies are based.

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In this paper we discuss a blockchainless approach, which is currently being implemented in *iota* [1], recently designed as a cryptocurrency for the Internet-of-Things industry. Of course, any theoretical analysis would be incomplete without feedback from a working version of such a system; we hope that soon such a feedback would be available.

In general, iota works in the following way. Instead of the global blockchain, there is a DAG (= directed acyclic graph) that we call tangle. The transactions issued by nodes constitute the site set of the tangle (i.e., the tangle graph is the ledger for storing transactions). Its edge set is obtained in the following way: when a new transaction arrives, it must approve two¹ previous transactions; these approvals are represented by directed edges, as shown on Figure 1 and others (on the pictures, times always goes from left to right). If there is no directed edge between transaction A and transaction B but there is a directed path of length at least two from A to B, we say that A indirectly approves B. There is also the "genesis" transaction, which is approved (directly or indirectly) by all other transactions, see Figure 2. The genesis is described in the following way. In the beginning there was an address with balance containing all the tokens. Then the genesis transaction sent these tokens to several other "founder" addresses. Let us stress that all the tokens were created in the genesis (no other tokens will be created), and there no mining in the sense "miners receive monetary rewards".

A quick note on the terminology: *sites* are transactions represented on the tangle graph. The network is composed by *nodes*; that is, nodes are entities that issue transactions.

Now, the main idea is the following: to issue a transaction, users must work to approve other transactions, therefore contributing to the network's security. It is assumed that the nodes check if the approved transactions are not conflicting and do not approve (directly or indirectly) conflicting transactions². As a transaction gets more and more (direct or indirect) approvals, it becomes more accepted by the system; in other words, it will be more difficult (or even practically impossible) to make the system accept a double-spending transaction. It is important to observe that we do not *impose* any rule for choosing the transactions to approve; rather, we argue that if a large number of other nodes follow some "reference" rule (which seems to be a reasonable assumption, especially in the context of IoT, where nodes are specialized chips with pre-installed firmware), then for any fixed node it is better

¹this is the simplest approach; one may also study similar systems where transactions must approve k other transactions for a general $k \geq 2$, or consider more complicated rules

²if a node issues a new transaction that approves conflicting transactions, then it risks that others will not approve this new transaction, and so it will fall into oblivion

to stick to a rule of the same kind³.

More specifically, to issue a transaction, a node does the following:

- First, it chooses two other transactions to approve (in general, these two transactions may coincide), according to some algorithm.
- It checks if the two transactions are not conflicting and do not approve conflicting transactions.
- For the transaction to be valid, the node must solve a cryptographic puzzle (which may be computationally demanding) similar to those in the Bitcoin mining (e.g., it needs to find a nonce such that the hash of that nonce together with some data from the approved transactions has a particular form, for instance, has at least some fixed number of zeros in front).

It is important to observe that, in general, we have an asynchronous network, so that nodes do not necessarily see the same set of transactions. It should be noted also that the tangle may contain conflicting transactions. The nodes do not have to achieve consensus on which valid⁴ transactions have the right to be in the ledger (all of them can be there); but, in case there are conflicting transactions, they need to decide which transactions will become orphaned (that is, eventually not indirectly approved by incoming transactions anymore). The main rule that the nodes use for deciding between two conflicting transactions is the following: a node runs the tip selection algorithm⁵ (cf. Section 4.1) many times, and see which transaction of the two is more likely to be (indirectly) approved by the selected tip. For example, if, after 100 runs of the tip selection algorithm, a transaction was selected 97 times, we say that it is confirmed with 97% confidence.

Let us also comment on the following question (cf. [4]): what motivates the nodes to propagate transactions? In fact, in our setup the nodes do not have motivation not to propagate. Every node calculates some statistics, one of which is how many new transactions are received from a neighbor. If one particular node is "too lazy", it will be dropped by its neighbors. So, even if a node does not issue transactions (and hence has no direct incentive to share new transactions that approve its own one), it still has incentive to work hard.

In the subsequent sections, after introducing some notations in Section 2, we discuss algorithms for choosing the two transactions to approve, the rules for measuring

 $^{^{3}}$ we comment more on this in the end of Section 4.1

⁴i.e., transactions issued according to the protocol

⁵as mentioned above, there is a good reason to assume that other nodes would follow (almost) the same algorithm for tip selection

the overall transaction's approval (Section 3 and especially Section 3.1), and possible attack scenarios (Section 4). Also, in the unlikely event that the reader is scared by the formulas, (s)he can jump directly to the "conclusions" part in the end of corresponding section.

It should be noted that the ideas about usage of DAGs in the cryptocurrency context were around for some time, see e.g. [3, 5, 6, 7, 10]. Specifically, the work [6] introduces the so-called GHOST protocol, which proposes a modification of the Bitcoin protocol by making the main ledger a tree instead of the blockchain; it is shown that such a modification permits to reduce the confirmation times and improve the overall security of the network. In the paper [7] the authors consider a DAG-based cryptocurrency model; differently from our model, the sites of the DAG are blocks (not individual transactions), the miners compete for transactions' fees, and (as in Bitcoin) new tokens may be created. Also, observe that in the work [5] a solution somewhat similar to ours was proposed, although it does not discuss any particular tip approval strategies. We mention also another approach [2, 8] that aims to make Bitcoin micro-payments possible by establishing peer-to-peer payment channels.

2 Weights and more

Here, we define the (own) weight of a transaction and related concepts. The weight of a transaction is proportional to the amount of work that the issuing node invested into it; in practice, the weight may assume only values 3^n , where n is positive integer and belongs to some nonempty interval of acceptable values⁶.

One of the notions we need is the *cumulative weight* of a transaction: it is defined as the own weight of this transaction plus the sum of own weights of all transactions that approve our transaction directly or indirectly. This algorithm of cumulative weights calculation is illustrated on Figure 1. The boxes represent transactions; the small numbers in the SE corner stand for the own weights of the transactions, while the (bigger) bold numbers are the cumulative weights. For example, the transaction F is approved, directly or indirectly, by the transactions A, B, C, E. The cumulative weight of F is 9 = 3 + 1 + 3 + 1 + 1, the sum of the weight of F and the weights of A, B, C, E.

On the top picture, the only unapproved transactions (the "tips") are A and C. When the new transaction X comes and approves A and C, it becomes the only tip; the cumulative weight of all other transactions increases by 3 (which is the weight of X).

⁶this interval should also be finite — see the "large weight attack" in Section 4




Figure 1: On the weights (re)calculation




Figure 2: On the calculation of scores (circled)

For the discussion of approval algorithms, we need also to introduce some other variables. First, for a site (i.e., a transaction) of the tangle, we introduce its

- height, as the length of the longest oriented path to the genesis;
- depth, as the length of the longest reverse-oriented path to some tip.

For example, on Figure 2, G has height 1 and depth 3 (because of the reverse path F, B, A), while D has height 2 and depth 2. Also, let us introduce the notion of the score. By definition, the score of a transaction is sum of own weights of all transactions approved by this transaction plus the own weight of the transaction See Figure 2. Again, the only tips are A and C. Transaction A approves (directly or indirectly) transactions B, D, F, G, so the score of A is 1 + 3 + 1 + 3 + 1 = 9. Analogously, the score of C is C i

Also, let us observe that, among the above metrics, the cumulative weight is the most important for us (although heights, depths, and scores will briefly enter to some discussions as well).

3 Stability of the system, and cutsets

Let L(t) be the total number of tips (i.e., unapproved transactions) in the system at time t. One, of course, expects that the stochastic process L(t) remains $stable^7$ (more precisely, positive recurrent, see Sections 4.4 and 6.5 of [9] for formal definitions; in particular, positive recurrence implies that the limit of $\mathbb{P}[L(t) = k]$ as $t \to \infty$ should

⁷under an additional assumption that the process is time-homogeneous

exist and be positive for all $k \geq 1$). Intuitively, we expect that L(t) should fluctuate around a constant value, and not escape to infinity (thus leaving a lot of unapproved transactions behind).

To analyze the stability properties of L(t), we need some assumptions. Let λ be the rate of the input (Poisson) flow of transactions; for simplicity, let us assume for now that it remains constant. Assume that all devices have approximately the same computing power, and let h(L,N) be the average time a device needs to do the calculations necessary to issue a transaction in the situation when there are L tips and the total number of transactions is N. First, we consider the strategy when, to issue a transaction, a node just chooses two tips at random and approves them. In this case, one may assume that the Poisson flows of approvals to different tips are independent, and have rate λ/L (this follows e.g. from Proposition 5.2 of [9]). Therefore,

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{nobody approves a given tip during time } h(L, N)] = \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda h(L, N)}{L}\right).$$
 (1)

This means that the expected increment of the total number of tips at the moment when our device issues a transaction equals to

$$1 - 2\exp\left(-\frac{\lambda h(L, N)}{L}\right) \tag{2}$$

(in the above formula, "1" corresponds to the new tip created by the transaction, and the second term is the expected number of "erased" tips). Now, L(t) is in fact a continuous-time random walk on $\mathbb{N} = \{1, 2, 3, \ldots\}$, with nearest-neighbor transitions. Indeed, if the two chosen transactions were already approved by others, then the process jumps one unit to the left, if both chosen transactions were not approved, then the process jumps one unit to the right, and in the last possible case it remain on the same place.

Now, to understand the typical behavior of the process, observe that the drift in (2) is positive for small L and negative (at least in the case when h(L, N) = o(L) as $L \to \infty$; or just assuming that the main contribution to the computation/propagation time does not come from handling the tips) for large L. The "typical" value of L would be where (2) vanishes, that is, L_0 such that

$$L_0 \approx \frac{\lambda h(L_0, N)}{\ln 2} \approx 1.44 \cdot \lambda h(L_0, N). \tag{3}$$

Clearly, L_0 defined above is also the typical size of the set of tips. Also, the expected time for a transaction to be approved for the first time is around L_0/λ .

Also, observe that (at least in the case when the nodes try to approve tips) at any fixed time t the set of transactions that were tips at some moment $s \in [t, t+h(L_0, N)]$ typically constitutes a cutset, in the sense that any path from a transaction issued at time t' > t to the genesis must pass through this set. It is important that the size of the cutsets becomes small at least occasionally; one may then use the small cutsets as checkpoints, for possible DAG pruning and other tasks.

Now, the above "purely random" strategy is not very good in practice, because it does not encourage approving tips: a "lazy" user could just always approve a fixed couple of very old transactions (and therefore not contributing to approval of more recent transactions) without being punished for such behavior⁸. To discourage the behavior of this sort, one has to adopt a strategy which is biased towards the tips with higher score.

An example of such a strategy can be the following. Fix a parameter $\alpha \in (0, 1)$; then, choose the two transactions to approve between the top αL (with respect to their score). The same considerations as above imply that the typical size of the set of tips will be

$$L_0^{(\alpha)} \approx \frac{\lambda h(L_0, N)}{\alpha \ln 2} \approx 1.44 \cdot \alpha^{-1} \lambda h(L_0, N).$$
 (4)

As for the expected time for a transaction to be approved for the first time, the situation a bit more complicated. Before starting the discussion about the expected time for a transaction to be approved for the first time, observe that we can distinguish essentially two regimes (see Figure 3).

- Low load: the typical number of tips is small, and even frequently becomes 1. This may happen when the flow of transactions is small enough, so that it is not probable that several different transactions approve the same tip; also, if the network latency is very low and the devices compute fast, then, even in the situation when the flow of transaction is reasonably large, it is also unlikely that many tips would appear. Also, we have to assume that there are no attackers that try to inflate the number of tips artificially.
- High load: the typical number of tips is large. This may happen when the flow of transactions is big enough, and the computational delays together with the network latency make it likely that several different transactions approve the same tip.

 $^{^{8}}$ we remind the reader that we do not try to enforce any particular tip selection strategy, so an attacker can choose tips in any way he/she finds convenient




Figure 3: The tangle and its typical tip sets (shaded) in low load and high load regimes. Observe that in the latter case some transactions may have to wait a lot until approved for the first time.

Of course, this division is rather informal and there is no clear borderline between the two regimes; nevertheless, we find that it may be instructive to consider these two essentially different situations.

In the low load regime, the situation is relatively simple: the first approval happens in average time of order λ^{-1} , since already the first (or one of the first) incoming transactions will approve our transaction.

Let us now consider the high load regime. First, if the transaction did not make it into the top αL , then this waiting time can be quite large, of order $\exp(cL_0^{(\alpha)})$ (since there is a drift towards $L_0^{(\alpha)}$ for smaller values of L and the size of the tip set needs to become much smaller than $L_0^{(\alpha)}$ for that transaction to be considered for approval). Therefore, a good strategy for the owner of such a transaction would be to issue an additional empty transaction referencing the first one, and hope that this new transaction enters into the top αL . Also, similarly to the above, if the transaction is one of the top αL , then with constant probability it will have to wait around L_0/λ time units to be approved for the first time (observe that $\alpha L_0^{(\alpha)} = L_0$). However, if that did not happen, then the transaction may fall below the top αL , and then a good strategy will be to promote it with an additional empty transaction.

Another easy strategy would be to pick, say, five random tips (among all of them), and approve the top two between these five. Again, if your transaction was not approved during time $\Theta(L_0/\lambda) = \Theta(h(L_0, N))$, it is a good idea to promote it with an additional empty transaction.

We also notice that the approval strategy may be further modified, for example, to prevent spamming. For example, the nodes might prefer tips with bigger own weight, making it more difficult for the spammer to have his transactions approved.

Now, it turns out that the approval strategies based on heights and scores may be vulnerable to a specific type of attacks, see Section 4.1. We will discuss more elaborated strategies⁹ to defend against such attacks in that section. Nevertheless, it is still worth considering the simplest tip selection strategy ("approve two random tips"), since it is the easiest to analyse, and therefore may give some insight about the qualitative and quantitative behavior of the system.

Conclusions:

- 1. We distinguish between two regimes, low load and high load, as depicted on Figure 3.
- 2. In the low load regime, usually there are not many tips (say, one or two), and a tip gets approved for the first time in $\Theta(\lambda^{-1})$, where λ is the rate of the incoming flow of transactions.
- 3. In the high load regime, the typical number of tips depends on the approval strategy (i.e., how the new transaction chooses the other two transactions for approval).
- 4. For the "approve two random tips" strategy, the typical number of tips is given by (3). It can be shown that this strategy is optimal with respect to the typical number of tips; however, it is not practical to adopt it because it does not encourage approving tips.
- 5. For the strategy "approve two random tips among top $\alpha L(t)$ " (which does not have the above disadvantage), the typical number of tips is given by (4).
- 6. however, more elaborated strategies are needed; a family of such strategies will be described in Section 4.1.

⁹In fact, the author's feeling is that the tip approval strategy is *the* most important ingredient for constructing a tangle-based cryptocurrency. It is there that many attack vectors are hiding. Also, since there is usually no way to *enforce* a particular tip approval strategy, it must be such that the nodes would voluntarily choose to follow it knowing that at least a good proportion of other nodes does so.

7. In the high load regime, the typical time until a tip is approved is $\Theta(h)$, where h is the average computation/propagation time for a node. However, if the first approval did not occur in the above time interval, it is a good idea (for the issuer/receiver) to promote that transaction with an additional empty transaction.

3.1 How fast does the cumulative weight typically grow?

In the low load regime, after our transaction gets approved several times, its cumulative weight will grow with speed λw , where w is the average weight of a generic transaction, since essentially all new transactions will indirectly reference our transaction.

As for the high load regime, as observed earlier in this section, if a transaction is old enough and with big cumulative weight, then the cumulative weight grows with speed λw for the same reasons. Also, we saw that in the beginning the transaction may have to wait for some time to be approved, and it is clear that its cumulative weight behaves in a random fashion at that time. To see, how fast does the cumulative weight grow after the transaction gets several approvals, let use denote (for simplicity, we start counting time at the moment when our transaction has been created) by H(t) the expected cumulative weight at time t, and by K(t) the expected number of tips that approve our transaction at time t (or simply "our tips"). Let us also abbreviate $h := h(L_0, N)$. Also, we make a simplifying assumption that the overall number of tips remains roughly constant (equal to L_0) in time. We work with the "approve two random tips" strategy here; it is expected that the result will be roughly the same for the strategy "approve two random tips in top $\alpha L(t)$ ".

Observe that a transaction coming to the system at time t typically chooses the two transactions to approve based on the state of the system at time t-h. It is not difficult to obtain that the probability that it approves at least one "our" tip is $\frac{K(t-h)}{L_0}\left(2-\frac{K(t-h)}{L_0}\right)$. Analogously e.g. to Example 6.4 of [9], we can write

$$H(t+\delta) = H(t) + \lambda \delta \frac{K(t-h)}{L_0} \left(2 - \frac{K(t-h)}{L_0}\right) + o(\delta),$$

and thus deduce the following differential equation

$$\frac{dH(t)}{dt} = w\lambda \frac{K(t-h)}{L_0} \left(2 - \frac{K(t-h)}{L_0}\right). \tag{5}$$

In order to be able to use (5), we need first to calculate K(t). It is not immediately clear how to do this, since a tip at time t-h may not be a tip at time t, and, in the case

when the newly coming transaction approves such a tip, the overall number of tips approving the original transaction increases by 1. Now, the crucial observation is that the probability that a tip at time t-h remains a tip at time t is approximately 1/2, recall (1) and (3). So, at time t essentially a half of K(t-h) "previous" our tips remain to be tips, while the other half will be already approved at least once. Let us denote by A the set of those (approximately) K(t-h)/2 tips at time t-h that remained tips at time t, and the set of other K(t-h)/2 tips (that were already approved) will be denoted by B. Let p_1 be the probability that the newly arrived transaction approves at least 1 transaction from B and does not approve any transactions from A. Also, let p_2 be the probability that both approved transactions belong to A. Clearly, p_1 and p_2 are, respectively, the probabilities that the current number of "our" tips increases or decreases by 1 upon arrival of the new transaction. We have

$$p_{1} = \left(\frac{K(t-h)}{2L_{0}}\right)^{2} + 2 \times \frac{K(t-h)}{2L_{0}} \left(1 - \frac{K(t-h)}{L_{0}}\right),$$

$$p_{2} = \left(\frac{K(t-h)}{2L_{0}}\right)^{2}$$

(to obtain the first expression, observe that p_1 equals to the probability that both approved tips belong to B plus twice the probability that the first tip belongs to B and the second tip does not belong to $A \cup B$). Analogously to (5), the differential equation for K(t) then writes:

$$\frac{dK(t)}{dt} = (p_1 - p_2)\lambda = \lambda \frac{K(t - h)}{L_0} \left(1 - \frac{K(t - h)}{L_0}\right).$$
 (6)

It is difficult to solve (6) exactly, so we make further simplifying assumptions. First of all, we observe that, after the time when K(t) reaches level εL_0 for a fixed $\varepsilon > 0$, it will grow very quickly almost to L_0 . Now, when K(t) is small with respect to L_0 , we can drop the last factor in the right-hand side of (6). Also, substituting K(t-h) by $K(t) - h \frac{dK(t)}{dt}$, we obtain a simplified version of (6) (recall that $\frac{\lambda h}{L_0} = \ln 2$):

$$\frac{dK(t)}{dt} \approx \frac{\lambda}{1 + \ln 2} \frac{K(t)}{L_0} \approx 0.59 \cdot \frac{\lambda K(t)}{L_0},\tag{7}$$

with boundary condition K(0) = 1. This differential equation solves to

$$K(t) \approx \exp\left(\frac{t \ln 2}{(1 + \ln 2)h}\right) \approx \exp\left(0.41 \frac{t}{h}\right).$$
 (8)

So, taking logarithms in (8), we find that the time when K(t) reaches εL_0 is roughly

$$t_0 \approx \left(1 + (\ln 2)^{-1}\right)h \times \left(\ln L_0 - \ln \varepsilon^{-1}\right) \lesssim 2.44 \cdot h \ln L_0. \tag{9}$$

Turning back to (5) (and, as before, dropping the last term in the right-hand side) we obtain that during the "adaptation period" (i.e., $t \le t_0$ with t_0 as in (9)), it holds that

$$\frac{dH(t)}{dt} \approx \frac{2w\lambda}{L_0 \exp\left(\frac{\ln 2}{1+\ln 2}\right)} K(t)$$

$$\approx \frac{2w\lambda}{L_0 \exp\left(\frac{\ln 2}{1+\ln 2}\right)} \exp\left(\frac{t \ln 2}{(1+\ln 2)h}\right),$$

and so

$$H(t) \approx \frac{2(1+\ln 2)w}{\exp\left(\frac{\ln 2}{1+\ln 2}\right)} \exp\left(\frac{t\ln 2}{(1+\ln 2)h}\right) \approx 2.25 \cdot w \exp\left(0.41\frac{t}{h}\right). \tag{10}$$

Let us remind the reader that, as discussed above, after the adaptation period the cumulative weight H(t) grows essentially linearly with speed λw . We stress that the "exponential growth" (as in (10)) does not mean that the cumulative weight grows "very quickly" during the adaptation period; rather, the behavior is as shown on Figure 4.

Also, we comment that the calculations in this section can be easily adapted to the situation when a node references s > 1 transactions in average. For this, one just need to replace 2 by s in (2) (but not in (5)!), and $\ln 2$ by $\ln s$ in (3)–(4) and in (7)–(10).

Conclusions:

- 1. In the low load regime, after our transaction gets approved several of times, its cumulative weight will grow with speed λw , where w is the mean weight of a generic transaction.
- 2. In the high load regime, again, after our transaction gets approved several of times, first its cumulative weight H(t) grows with increasing speed during the so-called adaptation period according to the formula (10), and after the adaptation period is over, it grows with speed λw , see Figure 4. In fact, for any reasonable strategy the cumulative weight will grow with this speed after the end of the adaptation period, because essentially all newly coming transactions will indirectly approve our transaction.




Figure 4: On the cumulative weight growth

3. One can think of the adaptation period as the time until most of the current tips (indirectly) approve our transaction. The typical length of the adaptation period is given by (9).

4 Possible attack scenarios

Let us describe an attack scenario:

- 1. the attacker pays to the merchant, and receives the goods after the merchant considers that the transaction got already a sufficiently large cumulative weight;
- 2. the attacker issues a double-spending transaction;
- 3. the attacker issues a lot of small transactions (very aggressively, with all his computing power) that do not approve the original one directly or indirectly, but approve the double-spending transaction;
- 4. observe that the attacker may have a lot of Sybil identities, and also is not required to necessarily approve tips;




Figure 5: The "large weight" attack

- 5. alternatively to item 3, the attacker may use all his computing power to issue a "big" double-spending transaction (i.e., with a very large own weight) that approves a couple of transactions prior to the legitimate one (the one used to pay to the merchant);
- 6. he hopes that his "sub-DAG" outpaces the main one, so that the DAG continues growing from the double-spending transaction, and the legitimate branch is discarded (see Figure 5).

In fact, we will see below that that the strategy of one big double-spending transaction increases the attacker chances. Even more, in the "ideal" situation of this mathematical model, this attack *always* succeeds.

Indeed, let $W^{(n)}$ be the time needed to obtain a nonce which gives weight at least 3^n to the double-spending transaction. One may assume that $W^{(n)}$ is an Exponentially distributed random variable with parameter $\mu 3^{-n}$ (i.e., with expectation $\mu^{-1}3^n$), where μ measures the computing power of the attacker.

Assume that the merchant accepts the legitimate transaction when its cumulative weight becomes at least w_0 (and this happens t_0 time units after the original transaction), and then it is reasonable to expect that the cumulative weight grows with linear speed λw , where λ is the overall arrival rate of transactions to the system (issued by honest users) and w is the mean weight of a generic transaction. Denote $w_1 = \lambda w t_0$, the typical total weight of the legitimate branch at that time.

Being $\lceil x \rceil$ the smallest integer greater than or equal to x, define $n_0 = \lceil \frac{\ln w_1}{\ln 3} \rceil$, so that $3^{n_0} \geq w_1$ (in fact, $3^{n_0} \approx w_1$ if w_1 is large). If during the time interval of length t_0 the attacker managed to obtain a nonce that gives weight at least 3^{n_0} , then the attack succeeds. The probability of this event is

$$\mathbb{P}[W^{(n_0)} < t_0] = 1 - \exp(-t_0 \mu 3^{-n_0}) \approx 1 - \exp(-t_0 \mu w_1^{-1}) \approx \frac{t_0 \mu}{w_1}$$

(at least in the case when $\frac{t_0\mu}{w_1}$ is small, which is a reasonable assumption). Then, if this "immediate" attack did not succeed, the attacker may continue to look for the nonce that gives weight 3^n for $n > n_0$, and hope that at the moment he finds it, the total weight of the legitimate branch is smaller than 3^n . Now, the probability of this is

$$\mathbb{P}[\lambda w W^{(n)} < 3^n] = 1 - \exp(-\mu 3^{-n_0} \times (3^{n_0}/\lambda w)) = 1 - \exp(-\mu/\lambda w) \approx \frac{\mu}{\lambda w}.$$

That is, although $\frac{\mu}{\lambda w}$ should be typically small, at each "level" n the attack succeed with a constant probability. Therefore, it will eventually succeed a.s.. In fact, the typical time until it succeeds is roughly $3^{\frac{\lambda w}{\mu}}$. Although this quantity may be very large, still the probability that even the "first" (i.e., during the time t_0) attack succeeds, is not very small. We thus arrive to the following conclusion: we need countermeasures. For example, limit the own weight from above, or even set it to constant (as mentioned in Section 3, the latter may be not the best solution, since it does not offer enough protection from spam).

Now, let us discuss the situation when the maximal weight is capped, say, by m, and estimate the probability that the attack succeeds.

In view of the above discussion (and also using some general intuition from the Theory of Large Deviations [11]), if the attacker wants to catch up with the main chain, he should produce only transactions with maximal allowed weight. Assume that a given transaction gained cumulative weight w_0 in t_0 time units after the moment when it was issued. Assume also that the adaptation period for that transaction is over, and so its cumulative weight increases linearly with speed λw . Now, the attacker wants to double-spend on this transaction; for that, at the time 10 when the first transaction was issued, he secretly prepares the double-spending transaction, and starts generating other transactions with weight m that approve the double-spending one. If at some moment (after the merchant decides to accept the legitimate transaction) the attacker's subtangle outweighs the legitimate subtangle, then the double-spending attack would be successful. If that does not happen, then the double-spending transaction will not be approved by others (because the legitimate transaction will acquire more cumulative weight and essentially all new tips would indirectly approve it), and so it will be orphaned.

¹⁰or even before; we discuss this case later

As before, let μ stand for the computing power of the attacker. Let G_1, G_2, G_3, \ldots denote i.i.d. Exponential random variables with parameter μ/m (i.e., with expected value m/μ), and denote also $V_k = \frac{\mu}{m}G_k$, $k \geq 1$. Clearly, V_1, V_2, V_3, \ldots are i.i.d. Exponential random variables with parameter 1.

Suppose that at time t_0 the merchant decided to accept the transaction (recall that it has cumulative weight w_0 at that time). Let us estimate the probability that the attacker successfully double-spends. Let $M(\theta) = (1-\theta)^{-1}$ be the moment generating function (see Section 7.7 of [12]) of the Exponential distribution with parameter 1. It is known (besides the general book [11], see also Proposition 5.2 in Section 8.5 of [12], even though it does not explain why the inequality should be, in fact, an approximate equality) that for $\alpha \in (0,1)$ it holds that

$$\mathbb{P}\Big[\sum_{k=1}^{n} V_k \le \alpha n\Big] \approx \exp\big(-n\varphi(\alpha)\big),\tag{11}$$

where $\varphi(\alpha) = -\ln \alpha + \alpha - 1$ is the Legendre transform of $\ln M(-\theta)$. Observe that, as a general fact, it holds that $\varphi(\alpha) > 0$ for $\alpha \in (0,1)$ (recall that the expectation of an Exp(1) random variable equals 1).

Assume also that $\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0} < 1$ (otherwise, the probability that the attacker's subtangle eventually outpaces the legitimate one would be close to 1). Now, to outweight w_0 at time t_0 , the attacker needs to be able to issue at least w_0/m (for simplicity, we drop the integer parts) transactions with maximal weight m during time t_0 . Therefore, using (11), we obtain that the probability that the double-spending transaction has more cumulative weight at time t_0 is roughly

$$\mathbb{P}\Big[\sum_{k=1}^{w_0/m} G_k < t_0\Big] = \mathbb{P}\Big[\sum_{k=1}^{w_0/m} V_k < \frac{\mu t_0}{m}\Big] \\
= \mathbb{P}\Big[\sum_{k=1}^{w_0/m} V_k < \frac{w_0}{m} \times \frac{\mu t_0}{w_0}\Big] \\
\approx \exp\Big(-\frac{w_0}{m}\varphi\Big(\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0}\Big)\Big). \tag{12}$$

That is, for the above probability to be small, we typically need that $\frac{w_0}{m}$ is large and $\varphi(\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0})$ is not very small.

Note that, at time $t \geq t_0$, the cumulative weight of the legitimate transaction is roughly $w_0 + \lambda w(t - t_0)$ (recall that we assumed that the adaptation period is over, so the cumulative weight just grows with speed λw). Analogously to (12), one obtains

that the probability that the double-spending transaction has more cumulative weight at time $t \geq t_0$ is roughly

$$\exp\left(-\frac{w_0 + w\lambda(t - t_0)}{m}\varphi\left(\frac{\mu t}{w_0 + w\lambda(t - t_0)}\right)\right). \tag{13}$$

Observe that, typically, we have $\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0} \ge \frac{\mu}{w\lambda}$ (since, during the adaptation period, the cumulative weight grows with speed less than λw). Anyhow, it can be shown that the probability of achieving a successful double spend is of order

$$\exp\left(-\frac{w_0}{m}\varphi\left(\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0}\vee\frac{\mu}{w\lambda}\right)\right),\tag{14}$$

where $a \lor b := \max(a,b)$. For example, let $m=w=1, \ \mu=2, \ \lambda=3$ (so that the attacker's power is only a bit less that that of the rest of the network). Assume that the transaction got cumulative weight 32 by time 12. Then, $\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0} \lor \frac{\mu}{w\lambda} = \frac{3}{4}$, $\varphi(\frac{3}{4}) \approx 0.03768$, and (14) then gives the upper bound approximately 0.29. If we assume, however, that $\mu=1$ (and keep other parameters intact), then $\frac{\mu t_0}{w_0} \lor \frac{\mu}{w\lambda} = \frac{3}{8}$, $\varphi(\frac{3}{8}) \approx 0.3558$, and (14) gives approximately 0.00001135, quite a change indeed.

From the above discussion it is important to observe that, for the system to be secure, it should be true that $\lambda w > \mu$ (otherwise, the estimate (14) would be useless); i.e., the input flow of "honest" transactions should be large enough compared to the attacker's computational power. This indicates the need for additional security measures (i.e., checkpoints) during the early days of iota.

Also, as for the strategies for deciding which one of two conflicting transactions is valid, one has to be careful when relying only on the cumulative weight. This is because it can be subject to an attack similar to the one described in Section 4.1 (the attacker may prepare a double-spending transaction well in advance, build a secret subchain/subtangle referencing it, then broadcast that subtangle after the merchant accepts the legitimate transaction). Rather, a better method for deciding between two conflicting transactions might be the one described in the next section: run the tip selection algorithm, and see which transaction of the two is (indirectly) approved by the selected tip.

4.1 A parasite chain attack and a new tip selection algorithm

Consider the following attack (Figure 6): an attacker secretly builds a chain/subtangle, occasionally referencing the main tangle to gain more score (note that the score of good tips is roughly the sum of all own weights in the main tangle, while the score

of the attacker's tips also contains the sum of all own weights in the parasite chain). Also, since the network latency is not an issue to someone with a sufficiently strong computer who builds the chain alone¹¹, the attacker might be able to give more height to the parasite tips. Finally, the number of attacker's tips can be artificially increased at the moment of the attack (by issuing a lot of transactions that all approve the same attacker's transactions, see Figure 6 below), in case the honest nodes use some selection strategy that involves a simple choice between available tips.

To defend against this attack, we are going to use the fact that the main tangle is supposed to have more (active) hashing power, and therefore manages to give more cumulative weight to more transactions than the attacker. The idea is to use a MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) algorithm to select the two tips to reference.

Let \mathcal{H}_x be the current cumulative weight of a site (i.e., a transaction represented on the tangle graph). Recall that we assumed that all own weights are equal to 1; so, the cumulative weight of a tip is always 1, and the cumulative weight of other sites is at least 2.

The idea is to place some particles (a.k.a. random walkers) on sites of the tangle, and let them walk towards the tips in a random¹² way. The tips "chosen" by the walks are then the candidates for approval. The algorithm is described in the following way:

- 1. consider all transactions with cumulative weight between W and (say) 2W (where W is reasonably large, to be chosen¹³);
- 2. place N particles independently there (N is not so big, say, 10 or so^{14});
- 3. these particles will perform independent discrete-time random walks "towards the tips" (i.e., transition from x to y is possible if and only if y approves x);
- 4. the two random walks that reach the tip set first will indicate our two tips to approve;

¹¹this is because the attacker can always approve his/her own transactions, without relying on any information from the rest of the network

¹²there is no "canonical" source of randomness; the nodes just use their own (pseudo)random number generators to simulate the random walks

¹³the idea is to place the particle "deep" into the tangle (so that it will not come to a tip straight away) but not "too deep" (so that it will find a tip in a reasonable time). Also, the [W, 2W] interval is arbitrary, one could chose e.g. [W, 3W] instead, or whatever.

¹⁴again, this choice is largely arbitrary; we use several particles instead of just two for additional security. The idea is that a particle accidentally jumps to the attacker's chain (which is supposed to be long), then it will spend a lot of time there and other tips will be chosen first.




Figure 6: On the tip selection algorithm. The two red circles indicate an attempted double-spend.

5. the transition probabilities of the walks are defined in the following way: if y approves x (we denote this $y \rightsquigarrow x$), then the transition probability P_{xy} is proportional to $\exp(-\alpha(\mathcal{H}_x - \mathcal{H}_y))$, that is

$$P_{xy} = \exp\left(-\alpha(\mathcal{H}_x - \mathcal{H}_y)\right) \left(\sum_{z:z \sim x} \exp\left(-\alpha(\mathcal{H}_x - \mathcal{H}_z)\right)\right)^{-1}, \quad (15)$$

where $\alpha > 0$ is a parameter to be chosen (one can start e.g. with $\alpha = 1$).

In particular, note that this algorithm is "local", one need not go to all the way to the genesis to calculate things.

To see that the algorithm works as intended, consider first the "lazy tips" (those that intentionally approve some old transactions to avoid doing verification), see Figure 6. Observe that, even if the particle is in a site approved by such a tip, it is not probable that the lazy tip would be selected, since the cumulative weights difference will be very large, look at (15).

Next, consider the following attack: the attacker secretly builds a chain (a "parasite chain") containing a transaction that empties his/her account to another account under his/her control (indicated as the leftmost red circle on Figure 6). At some point the attacker issues a transaction in the main tangle (indicated as the other red circle), and waits until the merchant accepts it. The parasite chain occasionally references the main tangle (hence the name) and so its sites have good height/score (even better than those of the main tangle), although the cumulative weight is not so big in that chain. Note also that it cannot reference the main tangle after the merchant's transaction. Also, the attacker might try to artificially inflate the number of his/her

tips at the moment of the attack, as shown on the picture. The attacker's idea is to make the nodes reference the parasite chain, so that the "good" tangle would become orphaned.

Now, it is easy to see why the MCMC selection algorithm with high probability will not select one of the attacker's tips. Basically, the reason is the same as why the algorithm does not select the lazy tips: the sites of the parasite chain will have a much smaller cumulative weight than the main tangle's sites they reference. Therefore, it is not probable that the random walk will ever jump to the parasite chain (unless it begins there, but this is not very probable too, since the main tangle contains more sites).

Next, let us comment on why the nodes would follow (at least approximately) this algorithm. Recall that, as observed in Section 1, it is reasonable to assume that at least a "good" proportion of the nodes will follow the reference algorithm. Also, because of computational and network delays, the tip selection algorithm would rather work with a past snapshot of the tangle (with respect to the moment when the transaction is issued). Now, it may be a good idea to intentionally move this snapshot more to the past¹⁵ in the reference algorithm, for the reasons that we explain in the sequel. Imagine a "selfish" node that just wants to maximize the chances that his/her transaction will be soon approved. The MCMC algorithm of this section (adopted by a considerable proportion of other nodes) defines a probability distribution on the set of tips; clearly, a natural first choice for that node would be picking the tips where the maximum of that distribution is attained. However, if many other nodes also behave in a selfish way (which is quite reasonable to assume as well) and use the same strategy, then they all will lose: many new transactions will approve the same two tips at (roughly) the same time, so there will be too much competition between them for subsequent approval (since the nodes use a past snapshot, they will not yet "feel" the cumulative weight increase caused by this mass approval of the two tips). So, even a selfish node would have to use some random tip approval algorithm, and the probability distribution of the selected tips should be, in some sense, "not far away" from the default probability distribution (i.e., the one produced by the reference tip selection algorithm). We do not claim that this "aggregated" probability distribution (in the presence of selfish nodes) would be equal to the default probability distribution, but the above argument shows that it should be close to it. This means that the probability of selecting "bad" tips would remain small. In any case (differently from Bitcoin), there is not so much incentive for the nodes to be

¹⁵that is, first the random walk finds a (past) tip with respect to that snapshot, and then it continues to walk towards the "actual" tips on the current tangle

selfish, since possible gains amount only to slight decrease in confirmation time.

Also, it is not set in stone that the transition probabilities should necessarily be defined as in (15). Instead of the exponent, one can take some other rapidly decreasing function, such as e.g. $f(s) = s^{-3}$. There is much freedom for the choice of W and N as well. In fact, the author's feeling is that the main contribution of this section is the very idea of using MCMC for tip selection; it is unclear if there is any "theoretical" argument that shows exactly in which way these parameters must be chosen.

4.2 Splitting attack

The following attack scheme against the above MCMC algorithm was suggested by Aviv Zohar. In the high-load regime, an attacker can try to split the tangle in two branches and maintain the balance between them, so that both continue to grow. To avoid that a honest node references the two branches at once (effectively joining them), the attacker must place at least two conflicting transactions in the beginning of the split. Then, he/she hopes that roughly half of the network would contribute to each branch, so that he/she would be able to "compensate" random fluctuations even with a relatively small computing power. Then, the attacker would be able to spend the same funds on the two branches.

To defend against such an attack, one needs to use some "sharp-threshold" rule (like "select the longest chain" in Bitcoin) that makes it too hard to maintain the balance between the two branches. Just to give an example, assume that one branch has the total weight (or any other metric that we may use) 537, and the total weight of the other branch is quite close, say, 528. If in such a situation a honest node selects the first branch with probability very close to 1/2, then, probably, the attacker would be able to maintain the balance between the branches. If, however, a honest node prefers the first branch with probability considerably bigger than 1/2, then the attacker would probably be unable to maintain the balance, because after an inevitable random fluctuation the network will quickly choose one of the branches and abandon the other. Clearly, to make the MCMC algorithm behave this way, one has to choose a very rapidly decaying function f, and also start the random walk at a node with (relatively) large depth (so that it is probable that it starts before the split was created). In this case the random walk would choose the "heavier" branch with big probability, even if the total weight difference between the branches is small.

It is worth noting that the attacker's task is very difficult also because of the network synchronization issues: he/she may not be aware about a good chunk of

recently issued transactions¹⁶. Another effective way of fencing off such an attack would be that a sufficiently powerful entity publishes a large number of transactions at once (in one branch), thus rapidly changing the power's balance and making it difficult for the attacker to deal with this change. Observe also that, if the attacker manages to maintain the split, the recent transactions will only have around 50% of confirmation confidence (recall Section 1), and it will not grow; so, the "honest" nodes may decide to start approving only the pre-split transactions then (and, in particular, not approve neither of the two conflicting transactions).

One may consider other modifications of the tip selection algorithm. For example, if a node sees two big subtangles, then it first chooses the one with larger sum of own weights, and then does the tip selection only there using the above MCMC algorithm.

Also, the following idea may be worth considering: make the transition probabilities in (15) depend not only on $\mathcal{H}_x - \mathcal{H}_y$, but on \mathcal{H}_x too, in such a way that the next step of the Markov chain is almost deterministic when the walker is deep in the tangle (to avoid entering the weaker branch), but becomes more spread out when close to tips (so that there is enough randomness in the choice of the two transactions to approve).

Conclusions:

- 1. We considered some attack strategies, when the attacker tries to double-spend by "outpacing" the system.
- 2. The "large weight" attack means that, in order to double-spend, the attacker tries to give a very big weight to the double-spending transaction, so that alone it would outweigh the legitimate subtangle. This strategy would be indeed a menace to the network in case the allowed own weight is unbounded. As a solution, we may limit the own weight of a transaction from above, or even set it to constant.
- 3. In the situation when the maximal own weight of a transaction is m, the best attacker's strategy is to generate always transactions with the maximal own weight that reference the double-spending transaction. When the input flow of "honest" transactions is large enough compared to the attacker's computational power, the probability that the double-spending transaction has more cumulative weight can be estimated using the formula (14) (see also examples below (14)).

¹⁶so the "real" cumulative weights may be quite different from what he/she believes

- 4. The attack based on building a "parasite chain" makes the approval strategies based on height or score obsolete, since the attacker will get higher values of those than the legitimate tangle. On the other hand, the MCMC tip selection algorithm described in Section 4.1 seems to protect well against this kind of attack.
- 5. As a bonus, it also offers protection against the "lazy nodes", i.e., those that just approve some old transactions to avoid doing the calculations necessary for validating the tangle.

4.3 Resistance to quantum computations

It is known that a (today still hypothetical) sufficiently large quantum computer can be very efficient for handling problems where only way to solve it is to guess answers repeatedly and check them. The process of finding a nonce in order to generate a Bitcoin block is a good example of such a problem. As of today, in average one must check around 2^{68} nonces to find a suitable hash that allows to generate a block. It is known (see e.g. [13]) that a quantum computer would need $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$ operations to solve a problem of the above sort that needs $\Theta(N)$ operations on a classical computer. Therefore, a quantum computer would be around $\sqrt{2^{68}} = 2^{34} \approx 17$ billion times more efficient in Bitcoin mining than a classical one. Also, it is worth noting that if blockchain does not increase its difficulty in response to increased hashing power, that would lead to increased rate of orphaned blocks.

Observe that, for the same reason, the "large weight" attack described above would also be much more efficient on a quantum computer. However, capping the weight from above (as suggested in Section 4) would effectively fence off a quantum computer attack as well, due to the following reason. In iota, the number of nonces that one needs to check in order to find a suitable hash for issuing a transaction is not so huge, it is only around 3^8 . The gain of efficiency for an "ideal" quantum computer would be therefore of order $3^4 = 81$, which is already quite acceptable (also, remember that $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$ could easily mean $10\sqrt{N}$ or so). Also, the algorithm is such that the time to find a nonce is not much larger than the time needed for other tasks necessary to issue a transaction, and the latter part is much more resistant against quantum computing.

Therefore, the above discussion suggests that the tangle provides a much better protection against an adversary with a quantum computer compared to the (Bitcoin) blockchain.

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